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INTRODUCTION 
A forum selection (“FS”), choice-of-forum, or choice-of-court clause 
is an agreement by which the parties submit a dispute to the jurisdiction of 
a designated court (the “chosen” court). Before one can properly speak of 
such an “agreement,” however, one must first verify that it came into 
existence and determine whether it is valid and enforceable. In turn, this 
determination may require answering several questions, such as whether 
there was a meeting of the minds, whether the parties’ consent was free of 
vices, and generally whether the agreement suffers from any defects like 
unconscionability or violation of public policy. These questions are 
hereinafter referred to as questions of “validity” or “enforceability” of the 
FS clause.1 
If the FS clause is enforceable, the court may have to answer other 
questions regarding the meaning, scope, and effect of the clause. Examples 
of such questions are whether the clause encompasses pre-contract or non-
contractual—in addition to contractual—claims, whether it binds non-
signatories or other third parties, and whether it confers exclusive or 
nonexclusive jurisdiction to the chosen court—sometimes referred to as 
“mandatory” or “permissive” clauses, respectively. For example, in 
certain countries, a FS clause is presumed to be exclusive unless it 
provides otherwise, but no such presumption exists in the United States.2 
                                                                                                             
 1. This Article uses the terms “validity” and “enforceability” as synonyms. 
Some authors distinguish between the two. See William J. Woodward, Jr., 
Constraining Opt-Outs: Shielding Local Law and Those It Protects from Adhesive 
Choice of Law Clauses, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 9, 16–21 (2006); Jason Webb Yackee, 
Choice of Law Considerations in the Validity & Enforcement of International 
Forum Selection Agreements: Whose Law Applies?, 9 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN 
AFF. 43, 47–62 (2004). Although this distinction is valid, it is unnecessary for the 
purposes of this Article. 
 2. This circumstance exists, for example, under the Brussels I Regulation, 
which is in force in 27 countries of the European Union (“EU”), the parallel 
Lugano Convention, and the Hague Choice of Court Convention of 2005. See 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters 2012, No. 1215/2012, art. 25(1) (Eng.) [hereinafter Brussels 
I]; Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 30/10/2007, art. 23 [hereinafter 
Lugano Convention]; Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements of 30 
June 2005, art. 3(b) [hereinafter Hague Convention]. This convention is in force 
in the EU, Mexico, and Singapore. The United States has signed but not ratified 
it. See 37: Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, HCCH, 
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This Article refers to these questions as questions of interpretation of the 
FS clause.3  
Some of these questions are legal, and others are factual; but in either 
case, and as long as the case has contacts with more than one state—that 
is, a “multistate” case—the court must address the logically antecedent 
question—under which state’s laws should one answer these questions? 
This is the choice-of-law question. This inquiry is necessary because, even 
with regard to factual questions, the laws of the involved states may differ, 
for example, on what inferences to draw from facts, who should bear the 
burden of proof, or how to ascertain the parties’ intent.  
Under which law should a court determine the enforceability of a FS 
clause and which law should the court use in interpreting the clause? 
Should the answer to either question differ depending on whether the court 
is the one chosen in the FS clause or one not so chosen (the “seized” 
court)? If a party files the action in the chosen court, should the court 
directly apply the “internal” law of the forum state—that is, lex fori, 
namely its substantive and procedural law exclusive of its conflicts law—
or should the court employ a choice-of-law analysis? If the latter, should 
that analysis lead to applying the law that governs the underlying 
contract—lex contractus4—which may or may not be the law of the forum 
state? If a party files the action in another court, should the court apply the 
lex fori, the lex contractus, or the law of the state chosen in the FS clause?  
This Article discusses these questions and the struggle of American 
courts to come up with the right answers.5 The discussion divides the cases 
                                                                                                             
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98 (last updated 
May 2017) [https://perma.cc/KJ8N-SWEE]. 
 3. Logically, a court determines first whether the clause is enforceable and 
then, if necessary, undertakes its interpretation. In some cases, however, the court 
must interpret the clause—for example, to determine whether it is exclusive or 
whether it encompasses the disputed tort claims—before deciding its enforceability.  
 4. Because of the doctrine of separability or severability of the FS clause from 
the rest of the contract, it is possible for the clause and the contract to be governed 
by different laws. To keep things relatively simple, this Article does not address this 
possibility. For the doctrine of separability, see SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, OXFORD 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW: CHOICE OF LAW 460–62 (2016). 
 5. A related issue is whether, in answering these questions, a federal court 
sitting in diversity should employ federal or state law standards. This Article does 
not discuss this issue. For discussions of this issue, see, for example, Matthew J. 
Sorensen, Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses in Federal Court after 
Atlantic Marine, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521 (2014); Kelly A. Blair, A Judicial 
Solution to the Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement Circuit Split: Giving Erie a 
Second Chance, 46 GA. L. REV. 799 (2012); Maxwell J. Wright, Enforcing 
Forum-Selection Clauses: An Examination of the Current Disarray of Federal 
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into three categories. The first category includes cases in which the action 
is filed in the court chosen in the FS clause (“Scenario 1”). The second 
category encompasses all cases in which the action is filed in another 
court. For purposes of analysis, these cases are divided into two 
subcategories: (a) cases in which the FS clause is not accompanied by a 
choice-of-law clause (“Scenario 2”); and (b) cases in which the FS clause 
is accompanied by a choice-of-law clause, usually contained in the same 
contract (“Scenario 3”). The figure below depicts the three scenarios and 
the court’s possible choices in each. 
 
FIGURE 1. LAW GOVERNING FS CLAUSES: THE COURT’S CHOICES 
 
I. SCENARIO 1: ACTIONS FILED IN THE CHOSEN COURT 
Scenario 1 consists of cases in which the action is filed in the court 
designated in the FS clause. Because this Article deals with multistate 
cases, the choice-of-law question is present even in Scenario 1 cases. For 
example, the Hague Choice of Court Convention of 2005, which is the 
most authoritative and recent instrument on this issue, provides that if the 
action is filed in the chosen court, the court “shall have jurisdiction,” 
                                                                                                             
Forum-Selection Clause Jurisprudence and a Proposal for Judicial Reform, 44 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1625 (2011); Ryan T. Holt, A Uniform System for the 
Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses in Federal Courts, 62 VAND. L. REV. 
1913 (2009). 
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unless the FS clause is “null and void” under the law—including the 
conflicts law—of the state of the chosen court.6 The European Union’s 
Brussels I Regulation, which applies in 27 EU states, also follows the same 
path.7 Thus, these systems require the chosen court to undertake a choice-
of-law analysis for selecting the state whose law will determine whether 
the FS clause is “null and void,” and that analysis may or may not lead to 
the law of the forum state.  
By contrast, as the following discussion illustrates, the American 
practice is to bypass the choice-of-law inquiry and directly apply the 
internal law of the forum state, which in this scenario is the state chosen 
in the FS clause.8 Affirmative evidence to this effect is found in state 
statutes dealing with “inbound” FS clauses, namely clauses choosing a 
court in the enacting state. For example, a New Hampshire statute provides 
in part: 
If the parties have agreed in writing that an action on a controversy 
may be brought in this state and the agreement provides the only 
basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, a court of this state will 
entertain the action if: 
(a) the court has power under the law of this state to entertain the 
action; 
(b) this state is a reasonably convenient place for the trial of the 
action; 
(c) the agreement as to the place of the action was not obtained by 
misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of economic power, or other 
unconscionable means; . . . .9 
                                                                                                             
 6. Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 5 (providing that the chosen court 
“shall have jurisdiction to decide a dispute to which the agreement applies, unless 
the agreement is null and void under the law of [the chosen] State”); see also 
Trevor Hartley & Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report, Convention of 30 June 
2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, ¶ 125 (2013), http://www.hcch.net 
/upload/expl37final.pdf [https://perma.cc/93V7-GMW4]. The accompanying 
Explanatory Report clarifies that the reference to the law of the chosen state 
“includes the choice-of-law rules of that State.” Hartley & Dogauchi, supra. 
 7. See Brussels I, supra note 2, art. 25 (“[The chosen] court . . . shall have 
jurisdiction, unless the agreement is null and void as to its substantive validity 
under the law of [the chosen] State.”). Recital 20 clarifies that the law of the 
chosen state includes its choice-of-law rules. Id. 
 8. See infra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 9. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508-A:2(I) (2018). Other states, such as 
Nebraska and North Dakota, have identical statutes. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-
414 (2018); N.D. CENT. STAT. § 28-04.1-02 (2018). 
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According to this statute, a New Hampshire court must enforce an inbound 
FS clause unless the clause fails to meet the requirements listed in 
subsections (a)–(c). Nothing in the wording of these subsections suggests 
that the court should consider any law other than its own.  
To be sure, the above statute, as well as similar statutes in other states, 
addresses only the enforceability and not the interpretation of inbound FS 
clauses.10 The statutes do not prevent a choice-of-law inquiry for a clause 
that is enforceable under these statutes but presents questions of 
interpretation, such as whether the clause is mandatory or permissive. It is 
conceivable that a court may undertake such an inquiry regarding those 
questions. 
Several other states, including Delaware, Florida, Illinois, New York, 
and Texas have enacted statutes designed to attract certain high-value 
contracts to their markets and any resulting litigation to their courts. These 
statutes provide that if these contracts contain both choice-of-law and FS 
clauses choosing the laws and courts of those states, both clauses will be 
enforceable virtually without any scrutiny and certainly without a choice-
of-law inquiry.11 For example, a California statute provides,  
Any person may maintain an action . . . in a court of this state 
against a . . . nonresident person where the action . . . arises out of 
or relates to any contract . . . for which a choice of California law 
has been made . . . by the parties thereto and which  
(a) is a contract . . . relating to a transaction involving . . . not less 
than one million dollars ($1,000,000), and  
(b) contains a provision . . . under which the . . . nonresident agrees 
to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state.12 
Even in the absence of statutes like the above, courts tend to bypass the 
choice-of-law inquiry in Scenario 1 cases. A review of cases in which the 
action was filed in a court chosen in the FS clause has not revealed any 
instances in which the court undertook a choice-of-law inquiry in 
                                                                                                             
 10. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2708, 12A-117 (2018); FLA. STAT. 
§§ 685.101–.102 (2018); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/5-5, 5-10 (2018); N.Y. GEN. 
OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-1401 to -1402 (McKinney 2018); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE § 15.020 (West 2018). 
 11. See supra note 10. 
 12. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.40 (West 2018). For a case misinterpreting 
this statute, see Summit Diamond Bridge Lenders, L.L.C. v. Philip R. Seaver Title 
Co., No. 326679, 2016 WL 7427500 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).  
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determining the enforceability of the clause.13 For example, in 2017, nine 
appellate cases involved this scenario, and the courts applied the law of 
the forum without a choice-of-law analysis in each case.14 Indeed, the 
chances of such an undertaking are slim. If the contract contains a choice-
of-law clause in addition to the FS clause, the two clauses are likely to 
point to the same state, that is, the forum state.15 If the contract does not 
                                                                                                             
 13. Abbott Labs. v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 476 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2007), a case 
presenting a somewhat similar scenario, is distinguishable on other grounds. A 
contract between Abbott, an Illinois company, and Takeda, a Japanese company, 
contained an Illinois choice-of-law clause and a floating FS clause. The latter 
clause required any lawsuit between the parties to be brought in Japan if Abbott 
were the plaintiff and in Illinois if Takeda were the plaintiff. Instead, Abbott sued 
Takeda in Illinois. In an opinion by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit affirmed 
the dismissal of the lawsuit under the Japanese prong of the FS clause. Among the 
disputed issues were an issue of interpretation of the clause—whether it 
encompassed tort claims—and one of enforceability—whether the clause was 
“unreasonable” in mandating litigation in Japan. The court decided both issues 
under Illinois law, holding for Takeda. However, because Illinois was both the 
forum state and the state whose law was chosen in the choice-of-law clause, this 
case does not support the proposition that the law of the forum qua forum governs 
FS clauses. Id. 
 14. Five of these cases involved only questions of enforceability. See Lubinski 
v. Hub Grp. Trucking, Inc., 690 Fed. App’x 377 (6th Cir. 2017); Corp. Creations 
Enter., L.L.C. v. Brian R. Fons Attorney at Law P.C., 225 So. 3d 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2017); Stone Surgical, L.L.C. v. Stryker Corp., 858 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2017), 
reh’g en banc denied (July 12, 2017), cert. filed, No. 17–556 (Oct. 10, 2017); Rocky 
Mountain Builders Supply, Inc. v. Marks, 392 P.3d 981 (Utah Ct. App. 2017); 
Deffenbaugh v. Giancola, 2017 WL 281019 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 2017). Three 
cases involved only questions of interpretation. See 1st Source Bank v. Neto, 861 
F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2017); Cent. Petroleum, Ltd. v. Geoscience Res. Recovery, 
L.L.C., 2017 WL 6374694 (Tex. App. Dec. 14, 2017); Am. Finasco, Inc. v. Thrash, 
2017 WL 391377 (Tex. App. Jan. 26, 2017). One case, Autoridad de Energia 
Electrica de Puerto Rico v. Vitol S.A., 859 F.3d 140 (1st Cir. 2017), involved both 
questions. 
 15. With the possible exception of “floating” FS clauses, cases in which the 
FS and choice-of-law clauses pointed to two different states are rare. This author 
is aware of only three such cases: Rucker v. Oasis Legal Fin., L.L.C., 632 F.3d 
1231 (11th Cir. 2011) (contract containing Illinois FS and Alabama choice-of-law 
clauses); Intermetals Corp. v. Hanover Int’l AG fur Industrieversicherungen, 188 
F. Supp. 2d 454, 458 (D.N.J. 2001) (contract containing Austrian FS clause and 
English choice-of-law clause); and Avanesians v. Coll. Network, Inc., 2016 WL 
3570424 (Cal. App. June 23, 2016) (Indiana FS clause accompanied by a choice-
of-law clause pointing to the consumers’ home states). For floating FS clauses, 
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contain a choice-of-law clause, the court likely will assume that the FS 
clause amounts to an implicit choice-of-law clause. By agreeing to litigate 
in the chosen state, the parties also have impliedly agreed to the application 
of that state’s law.16 Even if the court does not subscribe to this 
assumption, the court will have no incentive to apply the law of another 
state in determining whether it should hear a case that the parties agreed 
should be heard by that court.  
II. ACTIONS FILED IN A COURT NOT CHOSEN—THE “SEIZED” FORUM 
Cases in which the action is filed in a forum other than the one 
designated in the FS clause are more numerous and more difficult. They 
also are more likely to attract a choice-of-law inquiry. These cases can be 
divided into two categories: (a) cases in which the contract does not 
contain a choice-of-law clause (“Scenario 2”); and (b) cases in which the 
contract contains a choice-of-law clause in addition to the FS clause 
(“Scenario 3”). The discussion below begins with cases of the first 
category.  
A. Scenario 2: Contracts Without a Choice-of-Law Clause 
In Scenario 2 cases, the court has two options, which may lead to three 
different laws: (1) apply the internal law of the seized forum, the lex fori, 
without a choice-of-law analysis; or (2) employ a choice-of-law analysis, 
which may lead (a) back to the lex fori; (b) to the law of the state whose 
courts are chosen in the FS clause; or (c) to the law that governs the 
underlying contract—lex contractus. 
The Hague Choice of Court Convention requires a choice-of-law 
inquiry for most issues. Article 6 of the Convention provides that if the 
action is filed in a court other than the one chosen in the FS agreement, 
that court, the seized court, must suspend or dismiss the proceeding, unless 
(a) the agreement is null and void under the [law applicable under 
                                                                                                             
see Paul H. Cross, “Floating” Forum Selection and Choice of Law Clauses, 48 
S. TEX. L. REV. 125 (2006). 
 16. A FS clause alone does not amount to a choice-of-law clause; together 
with additional contacts, even if slim, it may amount to an implied choice of the 
law of the state designated in the FS clause. Cf. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 
407 U.S. 1, 13 n.15 (1972) (“[W]hile the contract here did not specifically provide 
that the substantive law of England should be applied, it is the general rule in 
English courts that the parties are assumed, absent contrary indication, to have 
designated the forum with the view that it should apply its own law.”). 
2018] WHAT LAW GOVERNS FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES 1127 
 
 
 
the conflicts] law of the State of the chosen court;  
(b) a party lacked the capacity to conclude the agreement under 
the [law applicable under the conflicts] law of the State of the 
court seised; [or] 
(c) giving effect to the agreement would lead to a manifest 
injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of 
the State of the court seised.17  
The bracketed words come from the Explanatory Report, which states that 
the reference to the “law” of the state of either the chosen court or the 
seized court “includes the choice-of-law rules of that State.”18 Thus, the 
only issues for which the seized court does not need to undertake a choice-
of-law inquiry are whether enforcement of the agreement would lead to 
“manifest injustice” or would be contrary to the “public policy,” both of 
which are by definition domestic law concepts.19 For all other issues, the 
seized court must undertake a choice-of-law analysis, and for some of 
those issues, it must employ the choice-of-law rules of another state—the 
chosen state—with all the concomitant renvoi complications.20 This rather 
complex scheme is likely to produce great uncertainty.  
By contrast, in the United States, courts, as well as legislatures, tend 
to avoid the choice-of-law inquiry—at least with regard to the 
enforceability of the FS clause.21 Several state statutes dealing with 
outbound FS clauses, namely clauses choosing a court outside the enacting 
state, reflect this position. These statutes fall into two categories. The first 
category encompasses general statutes that regulate the enforceability, but 
not the interpretation, of all outbound clauses that meet certain specified 
requirements. An example from this category is the following Nebraska 
statute, which provides in part as follows:  
If the parties have agreed in writing that an action . . . shall be 
brought only in another state and it is brought in a court of this state, 
the court will dismiss or stay the action, as appropriate, unless . . .  
                                                                                                             
 17. Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 6. 
 18. See Hartley & Dogauchi, supra note 6, ¶¶ 125, 149, 183–84. 
 19. See SYMEONIDES, supra note 4, at 78–82. 
 20. Renvoi is the application of the choice-of-law rules of the state whose law 
is designated as applicable by the choice-of-law rules of the forum state. For an 
in-depth discussion of renvoi and the possible complications, see SYMEONIDES, 
supra note 4, at 73–78. 
 21. For example, in 2017, nine appellate cases involved this scenario, and in 
all of them the courts applied the law of the forum qua forum. For citations, see 
infra notes 44–46. 
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(2) the plaintiff cannot secure effective relief in the other state, for 
reasons other than delay in bringing the action;  
(3) the other state would be a substantially less convenient place 
for the trial of the action than this state;  
(4) the agreement as to the place of the action was obtained by 
misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of economic power, or other 
unconscionable means; or  
(5) it would for some other reason be unfair or unreasonable to 
enforce the agreement.22 
The above requirements are more stringent than the requirements for 
enforcing inbound clauses, but they are similar in that both are phrased in 
terms of domestic law or perhaps general common law, without any 
reference to choice-of-law factors. For example, the statute does not require 
the court to apply foreign law of misrepresentation or unconscionability, and 
the court is unlikely to do so on its own. As alluded to earlier, these statutes 
address only the enforceability and not the interpretation of inbound FS 
clauses.23 Thus, for clauses that are enforceable under these statutes but that 
also present questions of interpretation, a court is free to undertake a choice-
of-law analysis to determine the law under which to answer those questions.  
The second category encompasses statutes that prohibit enforcement of 
outbound FS clauses in certain types of contracts that have contacts with the 
enacting state.24 For example, a Tennessee statute provides, 
Any provision in any agreement . . . restricting jurisdiction or 
venue to a forum outside this state or requiring the application of 
the laws of another state with respect to any claim arising under 
or relating to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act . . . is void 
as a matter of public policy.25 
Similarly, an Ohio statute provides that “[a]ny provision of a construction 
contract . . . for improvement . . . to real estate in this state that requires 
any litigation, arbitration, or other dispute resolution process . . . to occur 
                                                                                                             
 22. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-415 (2018). For identical statutes, see N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 508-A:3 (2018); N.D. CENT. STAT. § 28-04.1-03 (2018). 
 23. See supra note 9. 
 24. For a statute that seems to apply to all contracts, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 
15-7-120(A) (2018) (“Notwithstanding a provision in a contract requiring a cause 
of action arising under it to be brought in a location other than as provided in this 
title and the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure for a similar cause of action, 
the cause of action alternatively may be brought in the manner provided in this 
title and the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure for such causes of action.”). 
 25. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-113(b) (2018). 
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in another state is void and unenforceable as against public policy.”26 
Other statutes contain similar prohibitions in consumer contracts,27 
employment contracts,28 agency contracts,29 franchise contracts,30 and 
construction contracts.31 The common denominator among these statutes 
                                                                                                             
 26. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.62(D)(2) (LexisNexis 2018). 
 27. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22B-3 (2018) (“Except as otherwise provided 
in this section, any provision in a contract entered into in North Carolina that 
requires the prosecution of any action or the arbitration of any dispute that arises 
from the contract to be instituted or heard in another state is against public policy 
and is void and unenforceable. This prohibition shall not apply to non-consumer 
loan transactions or to any action or arbitration of a dispute that is commenced in 
another state pursuant to a forum selection provision with the consent of all parties 
to the contract at the time that the dispute arises.”); DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 12A-117(a) 
(2018) (“The parties to an electronic contract may choose an exclusive judicial 
forum; provided, however, that . . . if the contract is a consumer contract the choice 
is not enforceable if such choice is unreasonable and unjust.”).  
 28. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(A)(2) (2018) (“The provisions 
of every employment contract . . . by which any . . . employer . . . includes a choice 
of forum clause or choice of law clause . . . shall be null and void except where 
the choice of forum clause or choice of law clause is expressly, knowingly, and 
voluntarily agreed to and ratified by the employee after the occurrence of the 
incident which is the subject of the civil or administrative action.”). 
 29. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 1335.11(F) (“Any provision in any contract 
between a sales representative and principal is void if it purports to do any of the 
following: (1) waive any of the provisions of this section; (2) make the contract 
subject to the laws of another state; (3) limit the right of the sales representative 
to initiate litigation or alternative dispute resolution in this state.”). 
 30. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 523H.3.1 (2018) (“A provision in a franchise 
agreement restricting jurisdiction to a forum outside this state is void with respect 
to a claim otherwise enforceable under this chapter.”). 
 31. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22B-2 (“A provision in any contract . . . for 
the improvement of real property in this State . . . is void and against public policy 
if it makes the contract . . . subject to the laws of another state, or provides that the 
exclusive forum for any litigation, arbitration, or other dispute resolution process is 
located in another state.”); WIS. STAT. § 779.135 (2018) (“The following provisions 
in contracts for the improvement of land in this state are void: . . . (2) Provisions 
making the contract subject to the laws of another state or requiring that any 
litigation, arbitration or other dispute resolution process on the contract occur in 
another state.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-8-3(2) (2018) (“A provision in a construction 
agreement requiring a dispute arising under the agreement to be resolved in a forum 
outside of this state is void and unenforceable as against the public policy of this state 
if: (a) one of the parties to the agreement is domiciled in this state; and (b) work to be 
done and the equipment and materials to be supplied under the agreement involves a 
construction project in this state.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2779.A (“The legislature 
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is that they preempt a judicial choice-of-law analysis. They provide that 
outbound FS clauses that fall within the scope of these statutes are against 
the forum’s public policy and thus are unenforceable, regardless of any 
contacts with other states and, in many cases, even if the contract also 
contains an outbound choice-of-law clause.32  
Even in the absence of statutes like the ones described above, 
American courts are reluctant to undertake a choice-of-law inquiry when 
considering the enforceability of outbound FS clauses in Scenario 2 cases. 
The following quotations are the conclusions of two authors who have 
studied this question in depth—Professors Kevin M. Clermont and Jason 
W. Yackee. Clermont concludes that “[a]lmost all American courts apply 
their own law, the lex fori,” and “[m]ost do so with little or no thinking.”33 
Yackee, who sharply criticizes “[t]his bias towards the lex fori,”34 
acknowledges that “with rare exceptions, United States courts tend not to 
engage in explicit choice of law analysis” and instead “reflexively apply 
lex fori, even when the contract contains an explicit choice of law clause 
selecting the laws of another jurisdiction to govern the contract as a 
whole.”35 
                                                                                                             
finds that with respect to construction contracts . . . when one of the parties is 
domiciled in Louisiana, and the work to be done . . . involve construction projects in 
this state, provisions in such agreements requiring disputes arising thereunder to be 
resolved in a forum outside of this state or requiring their interpretation to be 
governed by the laws of another jurisdiction are inequitable and against the public 
policy of this state.”); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.42(a) (2018) (“The following 
provisions of a contract between the contractor and a subcontractor with principal 
offices in this state, for the construction of a public or private work of improvement 
in this state, shall be void and unenforceable: (1) A provision which purports to 
require any dispute between the parties to be litigated, arbitrated, or otherwise 
determined outside this state.”); FLA. STAT. § 47.025 (2018) (“Any venue provision 
in a contract for improvement to real property which requires legal action involving 
a resident contractor, subcontractor, sub-subcontractor, or materialman . . . to be 
brought outside this state is void as a matter of public policy.”).  
 32. By prohibiting enforcement of these clauses, these statutes generally 
render moot any issues of interpretation because, ordinarily, those questions arise 
only for enforceable clauses. Sometimes, however, a court must first interpret the 
clause to determine, for example, whether it encompasses certain claims or 
reaches certain parties and then decide whether it is enforceable.  
 33. Kevin M. Clermont, Governing Law on Forum-Selection Agreements, 66 
HASTINGS L.J. 643, 649 (2015) (footnote omitted). 
 34. Yackee, supra note 1, at 69. 
 35. Id. at 67. The “rare exceptions” to which the author alludes are cases in 
which the contract did contain a choice-of-law clause. Id. 
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An example of this trend is Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc.,36 
which involved a contract between an Italian manufacturer and an 
American distributor. The contract designated Florence, Italy, as the forum 
for resolution of any controversy “regarding interpretation or fulfillment” 
of the contract.37 The question was one of interpretation—whether the 
clause encompassed tort claims in addition to contract claims.38 The court 
answered the question in the affirmative without any consideration of or 
reference to Italian law.39  
Another example is Boland v. George S. May Intern. Co.,40 in which 
the question also was one of interpretation—whether a clause providing 
that “jurisdiction shall vest in the State of Illinois” was mandatory or 
permissive.41 To the disappointment of the clause’s drafter, the 
Massachusetts court held that this clause only “permitted, but did not 
require, the litigation to be brought in the State of Illinois.”42 The court did 
not make any reference to Illinois law.43 
Indeed, more often than not, courts tend to apply forum law reflexively 
without considering any other alternatives. For example, in 2017, nine 
appellate cases involved this scenario, and in all of them, the courts applied 
the law of the forum. Five of these cases involved only questions of 
                                                                                                             
 36. Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 37. Id. at 510. 
 38. Id. at 513–14. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Boland v. George S. May Intern. Co., 969 N.E.2d 166 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012). 
 41. Id. at 173. 
 42. Id. at 168. 
 43. See also New Greenwich Litig. Tr., L.L.C. v. Citco Fund Servs. (EU) 
B.V., 41 N.Y.S.3d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (applying New York law to determine 
whether a Dutch forum selection clause was mandatory); Turnkey Projects Res. 
v. Gawad, 198 So. 3d 1029 (Fla. App. 2016) (applying Florida law to determine 
whether a Nigerian forum selection clause encompassed tort claims). 
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interpretation,44 three cases involved only questions of enforceability,45 
and one involved both questions.46 
However, in one of the latest cases, Weber v. PACT XPP 
Technologies, AG,47 the court employed a choice-of-law analysis in 
interpreting a German FS clause, though not in determining its 
enforceability. The clause, written in German, provided that “Soweit 
gesetzlich zulässig, ist Gerichtsstand und Erfüllungsort der Sitz der PACT 
AG.”48 Partly translated into English, the clause would read as follows: 
“To the extent permitted by law, jurisdiction and place of performance 
shall be at the Sitz of PACT AG.” The untranslated word “Sitz” presented 
the first problem of interpretation. The defendant company argued that it 
meant the company’s statutory seat, or the place of incorporation, which 
was in Munich, Germany.49 The plaintiff argued that it meant the 
company’s “residence” or principal place of business, which, at the critical 
time, was in the United States.50 The clause also presented a second 
interpretation issue—whether it was mandatory or permissive—as well as 
issues of enforceability, explained below. In a thoughtful opinion under 
Texas conflicts law, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that German law should govern the interpretation of the FS clause and that 
forum-federal law should govern its enforceability.51  
The court stressed that “the question of enforceability is analytically 
distinct from the issue of interpretation” and that “[o]nly after the court 
                                                                                                             
 44. See Pinto Tech. Ventures, L.P. v. Sheldon, 526 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. 2017), 
reh’g denied (Sept. 22, 2017) (Delaware FS clause); Marullo v. Apollo Associated 
Servs., L.L.C., 515 S.W.3d 902 (Tex. App. 2017) (Washington FS clause); In re 
Bloom Bus. Jets, L.L.C., 522 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. App. 2017) (Colorado FS clause); 
Akesogenx Corp. v. Zavala, 407 P.3d 246 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017) (Delaware FS clause); 
Krueger v. Pulse Evolution Corp., 2017 WL 3097660 (Tex. App. July 21, 2017). 
 45. See Durkovic v. Park West Galleries, Inc., 217 So. 3d 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2017) (Turks & Caicos FS clause); Castro v. Pullmantur, S.A., 220 So. 3d 
531 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (Maltese FS clause); Olde Homestead Golf Club v. 
Elec. Transaction Sys. Corp., 714 Fed. App’x. 186 (3d Cir. 2017) (Pennsylvania 
forum, Virginia FS clause). 
 46. See In re Bambu Franchising, L.L.C., 2017 WL 4003428 (Tex. App. Sept. 
12, 2017) (California FS clause). 
 47. Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., AG, 811 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 2016) (deciding 
diversity jurisdiction case under Texas conflicts law). 
 48. Id. at 763. The contract was an employment contract between the 
defendant—a company named PACT AG—and the plaintiff—its former CEO, 
who was a German-born United States citizen domiciled in the United States. Id. 
 49. Id. at 762. 
 50. Id. at 769. 
 51. Id. at 764. 
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has interpreted the contract to determine whether it is mandatory or 
permissive does its enforceability come into play.”52 The court 
acknowledged that several courts failed to recognize this distinction and 
applied to both issues “general common-law contract principles without 
addressing the precise source of that law.”53 Other courts recognize the 
distinction but subject interpretation issues to a choice-of-law analysis 
only if the contract contains a choice-of-law clause.54 In this case, the 
contract did not contain such a clause, but, as the court reasoned, the 
absence of such a clause did not relieve the court from its general 
obligation to conduct a choice-of-law analysis.55 The need for such an 
analysis was especially obvious in this case, which was laden with foreign 
contacts and in which the defendant extensively pleaded and exhaustively 
argued for the application of foreign law.56 The court concluded that “the 
proper method” was “to apply Texas choice-of-law rules when interpreting 
a [FS clause].”57 Because Texas follows the Second Restatement, the court 
did likewise. It concluded that under §§ 6 and 188 of the Restatement, 
Germany had the most significant relationship, and its law should govern 
the interpretation of the forum selection clause.58 Under German law, (1) 
                                                                                                             
 52. Id. at 770. 
 53. Id. The plaintiff argued that the court should apply such “general common 
law” and interpret the clause against its drafter, which was the company. Id. 
 54. See infra Part II.B.2–3. 
 55. As the court put it, cases employing a choice-of-law analysis when the 
contract contains a choice-of-law clause do not “stand for the inverse proposition 
that in the absence of a choice-of-law clause courts must apply general [forum] 
law.” Weber,  811 F.3d at 770 n.19 (emphasis omitted). 
 56. See id. at 771 (“Courts may be justified in pretermitting this analysis 
when neither party contends that any distinctive feature of the relevant substantive 
law decides the dispute. And indeed, parties’ failure to brief choice-of-law 
analysis or arguments about distinctive features of foreign law seems to have 
driven many courts to default to general contract principles, even when they 
recognize that either ordinary choice-of-law rules or a valid choice-of-law clause 
would, in principle, dictate application of foreign law. But that is not the case here, 
when the choice of law might be determinative . . . and the parties vigorously 
dispute the proper source of law that should apply.”) (footnote omitted). 
 57. Id.  
 58. See id. at 772 (“This is a German-language contract, governing the 
compensation of a German-born businessman by a German company for his 
service on its supervisory board of directors, specifying that performance would 
be in Munich and contemplating at least permissive jurisdiction in the German 
courts for disputes arising under the contract. That the contract calls for 
performance ‘at the corporate seat of PACT AG’—which the parties agree is in 
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the word “Gerichtsstand” is a term of art that means jurisdiction and venue; 
(2) the word “Sitz” refers to the corporate seat; and (3) a FS clause is 
presumed to be—and in this case was—mandatory and exclusive rather than 
permissive, thus mandating litigation at the defendant’s seat in Munich.59 
The court then turned to the enforceability of the FS clause. The plaintiff 
argued against enforcing the clause because, inter alia, the Munich court 
would apply German law, under which the underlying employment contract 
would be invalid for lack of ratification by the company’s shareholders, thus 
denying plaintiff a contractual remedy.60 Interestingly, like most other 
American courts, the Fifth Circuit did not conduct a choice-of-law analysis 
in examining the enforceability of the clause.61 Instead, the court applied forum 
law, which the court assumed must be federal law rather than state law.62 Under 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. United 
States District Court for the Western District of Texas,63 the presence of a FS 
clause establishes a virtually insurmountable presumption that the private-
interest factors imported from the forum non conveniens analysis mandate 
dismissal of the lawsuit, unless, as “in truly extraordinary cases,” the public-
interest factors justify “disregarding the parties’ agreement.”64 The court found 
that the plaintiff did not rebut this presumption.65  
The court also noted that the invalidity of the underlying employment 
contract did not prevent enforcement of the forum selection clause 
because, under the American separability doctrine,66 which also is part of 
German law, a party challenging the clause “must demonstrate that the 
[clause itself] is invalid rather than merely claim the contract is invalid.”67 
Finally, the court found that the lack of a contractual remedy under 
German law did not mean the lack of any remedy because German law 
provided other remedies on quasi-contractual or equitable grounds.68 
                                                                                                             
Munich—likely settles the issue. Such a contractual specification of a place of 
performance is generally independently conclusive as to what law to apply.”).  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 774–75. 
 61. See supra notes 27–37. 
 62. Weber, 811 F.3d at 770. 
 63. See Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Texas, 571 
U.S. 49 (2013). 
 64. Weber, 811 F.3d at 776. For a list of both the private-interest and public-
interest factors, see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947).  
 65. Weber, 811 F.3d at 775. 
 66. For the doctrine of separability of FS clauses from the contract that 
contains them, see supra note 4. 
 67. Weber, 811 F.3d at 773. 
 68. Id.  
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B. Scenario 3: Contracts with a Choice-of-Law Clause 
In the third scenario, the contract contains a choice-of-law clause in 
addition to the FS clause, and the action is filed in a forum other than the 
one designated in the FS clause. This scenario occurs far more frequently 
than either Scenario 1 or Scenario 2. Parties who have the foresight to seek 
jurisdictional certainty through a FS clause also tend to be equally concerned 
with choice-of-law certainty. In this situation, the seized court has the same 
three options for the enforceability and interpretation of the FS clause as in 
Scenario 2, namely: (1) apply the internal law of the seized forum—the lex 
fori; (2) apply the substantive law of the forum designated in the FS clause; 
or (3) apply the law that governs the underlying contract—lex contractus.  
The difference from Scenario 2 is that in Scenario 3, the lex 
contractus is the law designated by the parties in the choice-of-law 
clause, rather than a law to be identified by the court through the 
choice-of-law process, which often is laborious or indeterminate. In the 
vast majority of cases, the law chosen in the choice-of-law clause is the 
law of the same state as the one chosen in the FS clause.69 Because of 
these differences, the dominance of the lex fori in Scenario 3 is not as 
complete as in Scenario 2. As detailed below, in a handful of cases, 
courts have applied the law designated in the choice-of-law clause in 
deciding at least certain aspects of the FS clause. For example, in 2017, 
nineteen appellate cases involved this scenario, of which:  
(a) eight cases involved only questions of enforceability, and all 
of them applied the law of the forum;70 
(b) six cases involved only questions of interpretation. Five of 
                                                                                                             
 69. See supra note 13.  
 70. See Osborne v. Brown & Saenger, Inc., 904 N.W.2d 34 (N.D. 2017) (South 
Dakota FS and choice-of-law clauses); Maslowski v. Prospect Funding Partners, 
L.L.C., 890 N.W.2d 756 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), review denied (Minn. May 16, 2017) 
(New York FS and choice-of-law clauses); Blackwell v. Sky High Sports Nashville 
Operations, L.L.C., 523 S.W.3d 624 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017), appeal denied (Tenn. 
May 18, 2017) (California FS and choice-of-law clauses); Ex parte Jewels by Park 
Lane, Inc., 2017 WL 2705578 (Ala. June 23, 2017) (Illinois FS and choice-of-law 
clauses); Donnay USA, Ltd. v. Donnay Int’l S.A., 705 Fed. App’x 21 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(New York forum, English FS and choice-of-law clauses); Charney v. Standard Gen., 
L.P., 2017 WL 3599522 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2017) (Delaware FS and choice-of-
law clauses); Resolute Trans., Inc. v. Shofur, L.L.C., 2017 WL 1164527 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Mar. 29, 2017) (Georgia FS and choice-of-law clauses); Debello v. VolumeCocomo 
Apparel, Inc., 2017 WL 6616704 (2d Cir. Dec. 28, 2017) (federal question case, New 
York forum, California FS and choice-of-law clauses). 
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them applied the law of the state chosen in the choice-of-law 
clause,71 and one applied the law of the forum;72 and 
(c) five cases involved questions of both interpretation and 
enforceability. Two of them applied the law of the forum to both 
questions,73 and three cases applied forum law to enforceability and 
the chosen law to interpretation.74 
1. Cases Applying Forum Law 
As the above one-year summary illustrates, even in Scenario 3, the vast 
majority of cases apply the lex fori. The same is true of previous years. The 
cases that follow this option are too numerous to count, whether in state75 
                                                                                                             
 71. See Collins on Behalf of Herself v. Mary Kay, Inc., 874 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(New Jersey forum, Texas FS and choice-of-law clauses); U.S. Chem. Storage, L.L.C. 
v. Berto Constr., Inc., 800 S.E.2d 716 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (New Jersey FS and choice-
of-forum clauses); WorkFlex Solutions, L.L.C. v. Fifth Third Bank, 2017 WL 3392766 
(Tex. App. Aug. 8, 2017) (Ohio FS and choice-of-law clauses); Spector v. Global 
Aerospace Underwriting Managers, Ltd., 2017 WL 2806881 (Cal. Ct. App. June 29, 
2017), review denied (Cal. Sept. 13, 2017) (German FS and choice-of-law clauses). 
 72. See Lab. Specialists Int’l, Inc. v. Shimadzu Sci. Instruments, Inc., 225 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017), as modified on denial of reh’g (Cal. Nov. 
21, 2017) (Maryland FS and choice-of-law clauses). 
 73. See Rigsby v. Am. Credit Counselors, Inc., 215 So. 3d 526 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2017) (Florida FS and choice-of-law clauses); Reed v. Reilly Co., 534 
S.W.3d 809 (Mont. 2017) (Kansas FS and choice-of-law clauses). 
 74. See Schwarz v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 802 S.E.2d 783 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) 
(Minnesota FS and choice-of-law clauses); In re Kubler, 2017 WL 3326937 (Tex. 
App. Aug. 4, 2017), mandamus denied (Tex. Aug. 25, 2017) (German FS and choice-
of-law clauses); MBC Fin. Serv., Ltd. v. Bos. Merch. Fin., Ltd., 704 Fed. App’x 14 
(2d Cir. 2017) (Swiss FS clause and British Virgin Islands choice-of-law clause). 
 75. See, e.g., Ex parte PT Solutions Holdings, L.L.C., 225 So. 3d 37 (Ala. 2016) 
(Georgia forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses); Tetra Tech Tesoro, Inc. v. JAAAT 
Tech. Servs., L.L.C., 789 S.E.2d 310 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (Virginia forum selection and 
choice-of-law clauses); Vardanyan v. Costa Rica Travel Planning, Inc., 2016 WL 
7378545 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2016) (Colorado forum selection and choice-of-law 
clauses); Campbell v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 2016 WL 817876 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Mar. 2, 2016) (Florida forum selection and choice-of-law clauses); Cohen v. Life Ins. 
Co. of the Sw., 2016 WL 3411672 (Cal. Ct. App. June 14, 2016) (Texas forum selection 
and choice-of-law clauses); Avanesians v. Coll. Network, Inc., 2016 WL 3570424 (Cal. 
Ct. App. June 23, 2016) (Indiana forum selection clause and choice-of-law pointing to 
the consumers’ home states); Robert Allen Taylor Co. v. United Credit Recovery, 
L.L.C., 2016 WL 5640670 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2016) (Delaware forum selection 
and choice-of-law clauses); W. Sky Fin., L.L.C. v. State ex rel. Olens, 793 S.E.2d 357 
(Ga. 2016) (Indian tribe reservation forum selection clause and tribal law choice-of-law 
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or federal76 courts. They are even more numerous if one were to include 
cases that do not even consider the choice-of-law question and thus 
“reflexively” apply forum law. As Professor Clermont observed, “The 
great mass of cases presenting the problem do not expressly allude to it at 
all, be that the fault of the judges or the lawyers.”77 He asks and then 
                                                                                                             
clause); KC Ravens, L.L.C. v. Nima Scrap, L.L.C., 369 P.3d 341 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) 
(DC choice-of-law and FS clauses); Energy Claims, Ltd. v. Catalyst Inv. Grp., Ltd., 325 
P.3d 70 (Utah 2014); Cagle v. Mathers Family Trust, 295 P.3d 460 (Colo. 2013); Pro-
Football, Inc. v. McCants, 51 A.3d 586 (Md. 2012); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 51 A.3d 
544 (Md. 2012); Moon v. CSA-Credit Solutions of Am., Inc., 696 S.E.2d 486 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2010); Houseboat Store, L.L.C. v. Chris-Craft Corp., 692 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2010); Golden Palm Hosp., Inc. v. Stearns Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 874 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2004); Fendi v. Condotti Shops, Inc., 754 So. 2d 755 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); 
Yamada Corp. v. Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 712 N.E.2d 926 (Ill. App. 1999). 
 76. See, e.g., Petersen v. Boeing Co., 715 F.3d 276 (9th Cir. 2013); Doe 1 v. 
AOL, L.L.C., 552 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2009); Fru–Con Constr. Corp. v. Controlled 
Air, Inc., 574 F.3d 527 (8th Cir. 2009); Wong v. PartyGaming, Ltd., 589 F.3d 821 
(6th Cir. 2009); Ginter ex. rel. Ballard v. Belcher, Prendergast & Laporte, 536 F.3d 
439 (5th Cir. 2008); Phillips v. Audio Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d 378 (2d Cir. 2007); P & 
S Bus. Machs. v. Canon USA, Inc., 331 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2003); K & V Sci. Co. v. 
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, 314 F.3d 494 (10th Cir. 2002); Silva v. Encyclopedia 
Britannica, Inc., 239 F.3d 385 (1st Cir. 2001); Evolution Online Sys., Inc. v. 
Koninklijke PTT Nederland N.V., 145 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1998); Afram Carriers, Inc. 
v. Moeykens, 145 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 1998); Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 148 
F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998); Richard v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 
1998); Stamm v. Barclay’s Bank of N.Y., 153 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1998); Haynsworth v. 
The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997); Mitsui & Co. (USA), Inc. v. MIRA 
M/V, 111 F.3d 33 (5th Cir. 1997); New Moon Shipping Co. v. MAN B & W Diesel 
AG, 121 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1997); Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir. 
1996); Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 1995); Shell v. R.W. Sturge, 
Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1995); Gen. Elec. Co. v. G. Siempelkamp GmbH & Co., 
29 F.3d 1095 (6th Cir. 1994); Bonny v. Soc’y of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993); 
Hugel v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 999 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1993); Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 
996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 
F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1992); Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Mgmt. Servs. Co., 926 F.2d 865 
(9th Cir. 1991); Polar Shipping, Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627 (9th 
Cir. 1981); Rudgayzer v. Google, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d 151, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); 
Androutsakos v. M/V PSARA, No. 02-1173-KI, 2004 WL 1305802 (D. Or. Jan. 22, 
2004); BNY AIS Nominees, Ltd. v. Quan, 609 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D. Conn. 2009); 
Intermetals Corp. v. Hanover Int’l AG fur Industrieversicherungen, 188 F. Supp. 2d 
454 (D.N.J. 2001); Evolution Online Sys., Inc. v. Koninklijke Nederland N.V., 41 F. 
Supp. 2d 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 77. Clermont, supra note 33, at 652. 
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answers, “What are the cases that ignore the problem doing? They, of 
course, are applying lex fori.”78 
Energy Claims, Ltd. v. Catalyst Inv. Group, Ltd.79 is a good example. 
This case involved a contract that contained an English choice-of-law 
clause in addition to an English FS clause.80 The plaintiff sued in Utah, 
arguing, inter alia, that the FS clause was unenforceable because it was 
contained in a stock subscription contract that was the product of fraud.81 
Under the doctrine of separability, the FS clause is enforceable unless the 
challenger proves that the clause itself, not just the contract, was the 
product of fraud. The Supreme Court of Utah decided to join the minority 
of courts that have rejected the doctrine of separability, subject to certain 
conditions not relevant here.82 In reaching this decision and reversing the 
lower court decision that had dismissed the action, the Utah Supreme 
Court made no reference to English law, even though the court considered 
the choice-of-law clause in interpreting the FS clause and determining 
whether it encompassed tort claims.83  
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa84 is another example of a case applying the 
lex fori. It involved an employment contract between a professional 
football player and his team, the Washington Redskins, a Maryland 
corporation.85 The contract contained Virginia FS and choice-of-law 
clauses.86 When, following an injury in the Redskins’ stadium in 
Maryland, the player filed for workers’ compensation with the Maryland 
Workers’ Compensation Commission, the Redskins challenged the 
Commission’s jurisdiction, invoking the Virginia FS clause.87 In turn, the 
player invoked § 9–104(a) of Maryland’s Labor and Employment Code, 
which did not mention FS clauses but prohibited any agreement waiving 
an employee’s rights under the statute.88 Applying this provision, the 
Maryland court upheld the Commission’s jurisdiction, reasoning that the 
Virginia FS clause was tantamount to the very waiver of the employee’s 
                                                                                                             
 78. Id. at 653. 
 79. Energy Claims, Ltd. v. Catalyst Inv. Grp., Ltd., 325 P.3d 70 (Utah 2014). 
 80. Id. at 74. 
 81. Id. at 75. 
 82. Id. at 85–86. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 51 A.3d 544 (Md. 2012). 
 85. Id. at 545. 
 86. Id. at 545–47. 
 87. Id. at 547–48. 
 88. Id. at 548–49. 
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rights that the provision prohibited.89 Again, the court made no reference 
to Virginia law. 
2. Cases Applying the Chosen Law 
A small minority of cases applied the law chosen in the choice-of-law 
clause in interpreting a FS clause contained in the same contract.90 As the 
underscoring indicates, virtually all of these cases involved questions of 
interpretation, not enforceability, of the FS clause. Specifically, most of 
those cases involved the question of whether the clause was mandatory or 
permissive. 
Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd.91 was one of these cases. The pertinent contract 
contained a Swiss choice-of-law clause, and the question was whether a 
clause stating that “Place of courts is Fribourg”92 was a mandatory or 
permissive FS clause. The United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
noted that the tendency among some courts has been to apply reflexively 
the lex fori but found that approach unsatisfactory.93 The court concluded 
                                                                                                             
 89. See id. at 549 (“Section 9–104(a), in plain, unambiguous language, 
precludes an agreement which exempts an employer from the duty of paying 
workers’ compensation benefits which are otherwise due under the Maryland 
statute. The section also precludes an agreement which waives the right of an 
employee to receive workers’ compensation benefits which are otherwise due 
under the Maryland statute. A holding that forum selection clauses constitute an 
exception to § 9–104 would contravene basic principles concerning the 
interpretation of statutes.”). 
 90. See, e.g., Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Teton Builders, 106 P.3d 719 (Utah 
2005); Dunne v. Libbra, 330 F.3d 1062 (8th Cir. 2003); Jacobson v. Mailboxes 
Etc. USA, Inc., 646 N.E.2d 741 (Mass. 1995); Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110 
(1st Cir. 1993); Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Energywave Corp., 773 P.2d 1143 (Idaho 
1989); Gen. Eng’g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 
1986); Rudgayzer v. Google, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Simon 
v. Foley, No. 07–CV–766S, 2011 WL 4954790 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011); Lanier 
v. Syncreon Holdings, Ltd., No. 11–14780, 2012 WL 3475680 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 
14, 2012); Global Link, L.L.C. v. Karamtech Co., 06–CV–14938, 2007 WL 
1343684 (E.D. Mich. May 8, 2007); TH Agric. & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace Euro. 
Grp., Ltd., 416 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (D. Kan. 2006), aff’d, 488 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 
2007). 
 91. Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 92. Id. at 423. 
 93. See id. at 428 (“A forum-selection clause is part of the contract. We see 
no particular reason, at least in the international context, why a forum-selection 
clause, among the multitude of provisions in a contract, should be singled out as 
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that a court “should ordinarily honor an international commercial 
agreement’s forum-selection provision as construed under the law 
specified in the agreement’s choice-of-law provision.”94 The court 
remanded the case to the district court to allow the parties to present 
evidence on Swiss law.95 Upon remand, the district court dismissed the 
case on forum non conveniens grounds, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal.96 
In Enquip Technologies Group v. Tycon Technoglass,97 a contract 
between an Italian manufacturer and its Florida-based United States sales 
representative contained an Italian choice-of-law clause and a clause 
stating that “[t]he law Court of Venice will be competent for any 
dispute.”98 The Florida company sued the Italian manufacturer in Ohio, 
where the manufacturer’s parent company had its headquarters, for breach 
of contract and unpaid commissions.99 The court concluded that because a 
choice-of-law clause accompanied the FS clause, the meaning of the latter 
clause should be determined under the law chosen by the choice-of-law 
clause, namely, Italian law.100 “A choice-of-law provision should be 
considered as evidence of the meaning of a forum-selection clause in the 
same contract,” said the court.101 “Just like [the] chosen law is used to 
interpret every other provision in [the] contract, it also should be used to 
interpret [the] forum-selection clause.”102 As noted earlier, the Brussels I 
Regulation, which applies in Italy, provides that a FS clause “shall be 
                                                                                                             
a provision not to be interpreted in accordance with the law chosen by the 
contracting parties.”). 
 94. Id. at 430. The court arrived at this conclusion after endlessly quoting 
from Supreme Court opinions favoring FS clauses and admitting that the opinions 
did not address the precise issue at stake. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit opined 
that their general disposition suggested that the meaning of FS clauses should be 
determined under the contractually chosen law. See id. at 428 (“Supreme Court 
opinions in international disputes emphasize the primacy of the parties’ agreement 
regarding the proper forum. . . . Thus, when the contract contains a choice-of-law 
clause, a court can effectuate the parties’ agreement concerning the forum only if 
it interprets the forum clause under the chosen law.”). 
 95. Id. at 432. 
 96. See Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 576 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2009).  
 97. Enquip Techs. Grp. v. Tycon Technoglass, 986 N.E.2d 469 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2012), appeal not allowed, 138 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2014-Ohio-566, 3 N.E.3d 
1219 (Ohio 2013). 
 98. Id. at 474. 
 99. Id. at 473. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 476. 
 102. Id. at 477. 
2018] WHAT LAW GOVERNS FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES 1141 
 
 
 
exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise.”103 In light of this 
provision, as well as a decision of the Italian Supreme Court, the Ohio 
court held that “[t]he plain meaning of the forum-selection clause here in 
Italian law is that the Court of Venice has exclusive jurisdiction.”104 
This case, however, involved an additional issue that affected the 
enforceability of the FS and choice-of-law clauses. One of the plaintiff’s 
claims was that the defendant violated an Ohio statute that imposed triple 
damages for failure to pay commissions to a sales representative who sells 
in Ohio.105 The statute also prohibited non-Ohio choice-of-law or FS 
clauses and declared null any waiver of its provisions.106 Because of this 
statute, the court concluded that although the two clauses were enforceable 
with regard to the plaintiff’s contract claims, the clauses were 
unenforceable with regard to the plaintiff’s statutory claim for triple 
damages for unpaid commissions.107 
In TH Agriculture & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace European Group Ltd.,108 
the contract contained a Dutch FS clause and a Dutch choice-of-law 
clause. Under the law of the Kansas forum and of the Tenth Circuit, the 
clause would be considered permissive.109 The court concluded that the 
meaning of the FS clause should be determined under Dutch law because 
                                                                                                             
 103. See Brussels I, supra note 2. 
 104. Enquip Techs., 986 N.E.2d at 481. The court then explained its reasoning: 
To be clear, we have not decided the permissive-exclusive issue strictly 
as a choice-of-law issue. Rather, we have decided it simply as an issue 
of contract interpretation. We applied Ohio contract-construction law to 
the forum-selection clause. Ohio law says that the meaning of a forum-
selection clause is the meaning intended by the parties. Based on the 
parties’ choice-of-law provision, which states that their agreement is to 
be interpreted in accordance with Italian law, we concluded that the 
meaning they intended is the forum-selection clause’s meaning in Italian 
law. Consequently, we considered what meaning Italian law would give 
to the clause’s language. We then determined that Italian law would give 
the forum-selection clause an exclusive meaning. 
Id. 
 105. See id. at 483–84.  
 106. See OHIO REV. CODE § 4113.62(D)(2) (2018). 
 107. The court explained, however, that this conclusion did “not mean that 
Ohio law applies to determine these damages.” Enquip Techs., 986 N.E.2d at 482. 
The court concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to triple damages under 
Ohio law and that it was unnecessary to choose between the laws of Florida and 
Italy because neither of these laws provided for triple damages. Id. 
 108. TH Agric. & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace Euro. Grp., Ltd., 416 F. Supp. 2d 
1054 (D. Kan. 2006). 
 109. Id. at 1075. 
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(1) the language of the Dutch choice-of-law clause was broad enough to 
encompass any and all issues arising under the contract and (2) even in the 
absence of the choice-of-law clause, Dutch law would be applicable under 
Kansas’s lex loci contractus rule.110 After discussing the voluminous and 
conflicting expert testimony submitted by six experts on Dutch law, the 
court concluded that the FS clause was presumptively exclusive, and the 
defendant did not rebut the presumption.111 
In Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd.,112 a contract between the 
plaintiff, a Virginia seller, and the defendant, an English buyer, provided 
that the contract “shall be subject to English Law and the jurisdiction of 
the English High Court.”113 English law would consider this FS clause to 
be exclusive, whereas federal caselaw, as well as a statute of South 
Carolina, the forum state, would consider the clause permissive.114 The 
United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that when the contract 
contains a choice-of-law clause, the court must apply the chosen law to 
interpret the FS clause.115 The court noted that, “taken by itself and out of 
context,” the FS clause appeared to make the designation of the English 
court permissive.116 When “taken in context,” however, the clause 
contained what amounted to “language of exclusion” because it provided 
that “English law, not American federal law, must be applied” and 
“applying English law makes a difference.”117 Based on this reasoning, the 
court held that the FS clause was exclusive and affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal of the action.118  
The appellate court also opined that even under South Carolina law,119 
the clause would be considered exclusive because South Carolina honors 
                                                                                                             
 110. Id. at 1074–79.  
 111. Id. at 1079. 
 112. Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK, Ltd., 628 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 113. Id. at 646. 
 114. Id. at 651. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 653. 
 119. The court’s main holding was that a federal court interpreting a FS clause 
“must apply federal law in doing so . . . [because] a forum selection clause 
implicates what is recognized as a procedural matter governed by federal law—
the proper venue of the court,” id. at 650, and that federal law on this issue 
preempted contrary state law, such as the aforementioned South Carolina statute, 
see id. at 652 (“[I]nsofar as the South Carolina statue would purport to impose 
South Carolina procedural rules on a federal court, it would be preempted by 
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choice-of-law clauses unless the chosen law is contrary to the state’s 
strong public policy.120 In the court’s opinion, the aforementioned South 
Carolina statute, which prohibited outbound exclusive FS clauses, did not 
reflect a strong public policy.121 Thus, the court concluded that under 
either federal or state law, “English law must be applied, and it takes the 
clause as mandatory.”122 
In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the contract contained 
California choice-of-law and FS clauses.123 Noting that the California 
choice-of-law clause was valid, the Supreme Court of Montana decided to 
apply California law “in interpreting the forum selection clause.”124 After 
discussing numerous California precedents, the court concluded that the 
clause was mandatory because it stipulated the parties “consent to conduct 
all . . . proceedings . . . in the city of San Diego, California.”125  
In Barnett v. DynCorp International, L.L.C., a diversity case filed in 
federal court in Texas, the court held that the FS clause was enforceable 
under both federal law and the law chosen in the choice-of-law clause.126 
The contract contained a Kuwaiti choice-of-law clause and a FS clause 
conferring exclusive jurisdiction to Kuwaiti courts.127 The defendant, a 
Texas company, hired the plaintiff, a Georgia resident, for work in 
Kuwait.128 The plaintiff challenged the FS clause under Texas law, 
arguing, inter alia, that he would not have any remedy under Kuwaiti law, 
                                                                                                             
federal law . . . [, which] explicitly regulates the appropriate venue in cases filed 
in federal court.”). 
 120. Id. at 653. 
 121. See S.C. CODE § 15-7-120(A) (2018). The court noted that  
under state law, a state provision establishing, as a procedural matter, 
that the South Carolina venue rules trump any contractual agreement 
selecting an exclusive forum outside of South Carolina is not the type of 
provision that South Carolina courts have recognized as establishing a 
strong public policy of the State that would overrule the parties choice 
of law outside South Carolina.  
Albemarle Corp., 628 F.3d at 653. The court cited Nash v. Tindall Corp., 650 
S.E.2d 81, 83–84 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007), which did not involve this issue or an 
analogous one. 
 122. Albemarle Corp., 628 F.3d at 653. 
 123. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 329 P.3d 1264 (Mont. 2014). 
 124. Id. at 1268. 
 125. Id. at 1266 (emphasis added).  
 126. Barnett v. DynCorp Int’l, L.L.C., 831 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2016) (decided 
under Texas conflicts law). 
 127. Id. (decided under Texas conflicts law). 
 128. Id. at 299. 
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which imposed a one-year statute of repose that would bar his action.129 
His action, however, was timely under Texas’s statute of limitations.130 He 
specifically invoked § 16.070 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies 
Code, which provided that “a stipulation, contract, or agreement that 
establishes a limitations period that is shorter than two years is void in this 
state.”131 
The plaintiff tried to frame this issue as a question of “validity” rather 
than “enforceability” of the clause.132 The court saw these terms as 
synonymous but reasoned that even if they were not, the plaintiff could 
not prevail because in either case the applicable law would be either 
federal law or the law that would be applicable under Texas’s choice-of-
law rules—that is, Kuwaiti law,133 and that the FS clause was enforceable 
under both laws.134 The court found that under Texas’s choice-of-law 
rules, specifically § 187 of the Second Restatement,135 the Kuwaiti choice-
of-law clause was enforceable because (1) Kuwait had a “substantial 
relationship” with the case; (2) Kuwaiti law would have been applicable 
even in the absence of the choice-of-law clause because the contract called 
for services in Kuwait; and (3) “[E]ven . . . assum[ing] that Texas law 
would apply absent a choice-of-law provision, and further . . . that Texas 
has a materially greater interest”136 in applying its law, the application of 
Kuwaiti law would not violate a “fundamental policy” of Texas.137 
Finally, in Summit Diamond Bridge Lenders, L.L.C. v. Philip R. 
Seaver Title Co., Inc., a Michigan appellate court also applied the law 
selected in the choice-of-law clause, but it ultimately held the FS clause 
                                                                                                             
 129. Id. at 300–01. 
 130. Id. at 300. 
 131. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.070 (2005). 
 132. Barnett, 831 F.3d at 301–02. 
 133. Id. at 303. 
 134. The court discussed at length the question of whether federal courts 
sitting in diversity must apply federal law or state law in determining the 
enforceability or validity of a FS clause. The court noted the circuit split on this 
question and discussed the pros and cons of each option, but it decided not to 
answer the question because it concluded that the plaintiff could not prevail under 
either option. See id. at 303–04. The court reiterated that under the state-law 
option, “we would not automatically apply Texas’s substantive law; rather, we 
would apply the state’s choice-of-law rules. Under those rules, Texas law would 
control only if the Agreement’s choice-of-law clause—which ‘exclusively’ 
selects Kuwaiti law to govern the Agreement and disputes between the parties—
is itself unenforceable.” Id. at 304 (emphasis added). 
 135. Id. at 304–05. 
 136. Id. at 306. 
 137. Id. 
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unenforceable under both the chosen law and the law of the forum state.138 
An escrow agreement between a California lender, a Michigan borrower, 
and a Michigan escrow agent contained a California choice-of-law clause 
and a FS clause providing that “[a]ny dispute arising from or related to this 
Agreement . . . shall be handled by the appropriate state or federal court 
located in California.”139 When the borrower sued the escrow agent in 
Michigan, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss based 
on the FS clause.140  
The court of appeal reversed the dismissal, following an obviously 
flawed interpretation of a California statute.141 The court accepted the 
plaintiff’s argument that when the contract contains both a choice-of-law 
clause and a FS clause, the enforceability of the latter clause should be 
determined under the law of the state designated in the former clause—in 
this case, California.142 This reasoning led the court to a California statute, 
reproduced above,143 which provides that “[a]ny person may maintain an 
action” in California courts against a foreign corporation if the action 
arises out of an agreement that contains California choice-of-law and FS 
clauses and the underlying transaction “involve[es] in the aggregate not 
less than one million dollars.”144 The court read the last quoted phrase as 
preventing California courts from entertaining actions in which, as in this 
case, the underlying transaction falls short of the $1 million mark.145 Based 
on this reasoning, the court found that the California FS clause would be 
unenforceable in California.146 
                                                                                                             
 138. Summitt Diamond Bridge Lenders, L.L.C. v. Philip R. Seaver Title Co., 
No. 326679, 2016 WL 7427500 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2016). 
 139. Id. at *1. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See infra note 146. 
 142. See Summit Diamond, 2016 WL 7427500, at *3. 
 143. See CAL CIV. PROC CODE § 410.40 (2004). 
 144. Summit Diamond, 2016 WL 7427500, at *3 (quoting § 410.40). 
 145. Id. 
 146. The court’s interpretation of the California statute is obviously erroneous. 
As the dissenting judge pointed out, the statute was designed “not to preclude 
anything, but rather specifically to attract big-ticket litigation to California by 
expressly allowing parties to maintain actions against foreign corporations under 
forum-selection clauses if the dollar value and other criteria are met.” Id. at *9 
(Boonstra, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). The statute is similar to statutes 
enacted in other states, such as Delaware, Florida, Ohio, Texas, and New York, 
in hopes of attracting high value litigation in their courts. See supra note 10. The 
statute simply is inapplicable to cases involving lesser amounts, leaving courts to 
entertain those cases under general principles. 
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The court then turned to a Michigan statute which, in some respects, 
is the reverse of the California statute in that it defines the circumstances 
in which Michigan courts should not enforce a FS clause, mandating 
litigation in a state other than Michigan.147 One of those circumstances is 
when the “plaintiff cannot secure effective relief in the other state for 
reasons other than delay in bringing the action.”148 The court found this 
provision applicable, reasoning that the “plaintiff cannot secure effective 
relief in California because the parties’ action fails to meet the threshold 
jurisdictional amount required to maintain an action against a foreign 
corporation in a California court.”149 Thus, the court held the FS clause 
unenforceable under both California law and Michigan law and allowed 
the action to go forward.150  
3. Cases Distinguishing Between Enforceability and Interpretation 
In recent years, some courts have begun distinguishing between 
interpretation and enforceability of FS clauses. Phillips v. Audio Active, 
Ltd.,151 a federal court case, was one of the first cases to articulate this 
promising distinction clearly. The United States Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals outlined a four-part inquiry in examining FS clauses when the 
contract also contains a choice-of-law clause. The first three parts consist of 
determining (1) whether the clause was “reasonably communicated to the 
party resisting enforcement”;152 (2) whether the clause is mandatory or 
permissive; and (3) whether the clause encompasses the claims in 
question.153 If the court finds that the clause was reasonably communicated, 
mandatory, and covered the claims in question, the clause is presumptively 
enforceable.154 In the fourth part of the inquiry, the court determines whether 
the resisting party has rebutted the presumption by proving any of the 
defenses that the Supreme Court’s decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co. allows—namely, demonstrating that the clause is “unaffected by 
fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power,” or its 
“enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which 
suit is brought” or would be “unreasonable under the circumstances.”155 
                                                                                                             
 147. Id. at *5–6 (majority opinion). 
 148. Id. at *6 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.745(3) (2016)). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at *5, *7. 
 151. Phillips v. Audio Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d 378 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 152. Id. at 383. 
 153. Id. at 385. 
 154. Id. at 386. 
 155. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10, 12, 15 (1972).  
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The court concluded that even if the contract contained a choice-of-
law clause, federal law as forum law must govern the fourth part of the 
inquiry “because enforcement of forum clauses is an essentially procedural 
issue . . . while choice of law provisions generally implicate only the 
substantive law of the selected jurisdiction.”156 The court also noted, 
however, that there was “less to recommend the invocation of federal 
common law to interpret the meaning and scope of a forum clause, as 
required by parts two and three of [the above] analysis.”157 For these 
issues, the court cited with approval the Yavuz case, which applied the 
chosen law in interpreting a FS clause.158  
In Martinez v. Bloomberg L.P.,159 the same court had an opportunity 
to apply the distinction between questions of enforceability and 
interpretation. The court held that the lex fori should govern the questions 
of enforceability and the chosen law, the questions of interpretation.160 
Martinez was a federal question case arising out of an employment 
contract that contained English choice-of-law and FS clauses.161 The court 
held that (1) the substantive law designated in the choice-of-law clause—
in this case English law—governed the interpretation of the FS clause; and 
(2) the law of the forum—in this case federal law—governed the 
enforceability of the FS clause.162 The court found that under English law, 
the plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims fell within the scope of 
the FS clause and that the clause was unenforceable under federal law.163 
The court explained at length why forum/federal law should govern 
questions of enforceability: 
Federal law must govern the ultimate enforceability of a forum 
selection clause to ensure that a federal court may [under The 
Bremen] decline to enforce a clause if “trial in the contractual 
forum [would] be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that [the 
resisting party] will for all practical purposes be deprived of his 
day in court,” or “if enforcement would contravene a strong public 
                                                                                                             
 156. Phillips, 494 F.3d at 384–85. 
 157. Id. at 385. 
 158. See id. (quoting Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 428–30 (10th Cir. 
2006)), discussed supra notes 91–96. In the end, the Phillips court did not have to 
apply the chosen law of England because neither of the parties had argued for its 
application. 
 159. Martinez v. Bloomberg L.P., 740 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 160. Id. at 214. 
 161. Id. at 214–15. 
 162. Id. at 214. 
 163. Id. 
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policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by 
statute or by judicial decision.”164 
Next, the court explained that the chosen law should govern the 
interpretation of the FS clause because forum law could 
undermine the predictability fostered by forum selection clauses, 
. . . frustrate the contracting parties’ expectations by giving a 
forum selection clause a broader or narrower scope in a federal 
court than it was intended to have, . . . [and] transform a clause 
that would be construed as permissive under the parties’ chosen 
law into a mandatory clause, or vice versa.165 
The court also reasoned that distinguishing between enforceability and 
interpretation of FS clauses “accords with the traditional divide between 
procedural and substantive rules developed under Erie.”166 The 
enforceability of a FS clause is a procedural question that must be 
governed by forum/federal law, whereas the interpretation of a contract is 
“quintessentially substantive for Erie purposes.”167 
For reasons explained in Part III,168 the distinction between 
interpretation and enforceability is promising and eminently sensible, even 
if many cases involve only one of the two categories169 and even if some 
courts fail to see the difference. For example, one court used the term 
“interpretation of the validity.”170 In another case, Raydiant Technology, 
L.L.C. v. Fly-N-Hog Media Group, Inc.,171 the plaintiff claimed fraud in 
the inducement of the contract,172 which is clearly a matter of 
enforceability, not interpretation. Although both parties relied exclusively 
on forum law, the court decided to apply the contractually chosen law.173 
                                                                                                             
 164. Id. at 218 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 
(1972)). 
 165. Id. at 220. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 221. 
 168. See infra Part III.B. 
 169. For example, of the 37 appellate cases decided in 2017 (see supra notes 
14, 44–46, 70–74), 14 cases involved only questions of enforceability, 16 cases 
involved only questions of interpretation, and 7 cases involved both questions. 
 170. Szymczyk v. Signs Now Corp., 606 S.E.2d 728, 733 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2005). 
 171. Raydiant Tech., L.L.C. v. Fly-N-Hog Media Grp., Inc., 439 S.W.3d 238 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2014). 
 172. Id. at 239. 
 173. Id. at 240–41. 
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Mixing enforcement with interpretation, the court reasoned that “where, 
as here, the case turns on the enforcement of a forum-selection clause, and 
the contract includes a choice-of-law provision, the law chosen by the 
parties controls the interpretation of the forum-selection clause.”174 
Similarly, in Jacobson v. Mailboxes Etc. U.S.A., Inc., the court stated that 
the chosen law should govern both the enforceability and the interpretation 
of the FS clause, but actually, the case involved only the latter issue—
whether the clause encompassed pre-contract wrongs.175 The same was 
true in TH Agriculture & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace European Group, Ltd.176 
The court spoke of “analyzing the enforceability of the forum selection 
clause under the [chosen] law of The Netherlands,”177 but the case 
involved only an issue of interpretation—whether the clause was exclusive 
or permissive.  
Other courts, however, show a better understanding of the distinction 
between interpretation and enforceability. For example, in Albemarle 
Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK, Ltd., the court applied the chosen law to 
interpretation and, after finding that the clause was exclusive under that 
law, the court examined whether enforcement of the FS clause would 
violate the public policy of the forum state.178 Similarly, in Rudgayzer v. 
Google, Inc.,179 a New York federal case, the court applied California law 
in interpreting the clause and federal/forum law in determining its 
enforceability.180 In Simon v. Foley, the court concluded that the chosen 
law should govern the interpretation and forum law the enforceability of 
the clause.181 After finding that under the chosen law the clause was 
permissive, the court allowed the action to proceed because the defendant 
was unable to challenge the enforceability of the clause under the law of 
the forum.182 In Lanier v. Syncreon Holdings, Ltd., the court followed the 
                                                                                                             
 174. Id. at 240 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 175. Jacobson v. Mailboxes Etc. U.S.A., Inc., 646 N.E.2d 741 (Mass. 1995). 
 176. TH Agric. & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace Euro. Grp., Ltd., 416 F. Supp. 2d 
1054 (D. Kan. 2006). 
 177. Id. at 1076 (emphasis added). 
 178. Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK, Ltd., 628 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 2010), 
discussed supra note 112. 
 179. Rudgayzer v. Google, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 180. Id. For an earlier case following exactly the same distinction, see AVC 
Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. P’ship, 740 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 181. Simon v. Foley, No. 07–CV–766S, 2011 WL 4954790 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 
18, 2011). 
 182. Id. at *6–7. 
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same distinction.183 After finding that the clause was mandatory under the 
chosen law of Ireland, the court examined the enforceability of the clause 
under the law of the forum and found it enforceable.184 
In other cases, the court applied the chosen law in determining the 
enforceability of the FS clause but only after finding that enforcement of 
the clause did not offend the forum’s public policy.185 Finally, in Cerami-
Kote, Inc. v. Energywave Corp., the court appeared willing to apply the 
chosen law in determining enforceability but eventually applied forum law 
through renvoi from the chosen law.186 The contract contained Florida FS 
and choice-of-law clauses.187 In examining Florida precedents, the Idaho 
court learned that Florida courts would enforce a FS clause but only if 
enforcement “would not contravene a strong policy enunciated by statute 
or judicial fiat, either in the forum where the suit would be brought, or the 
forum from which the suit has been excluded.”188 The italicized phrase 
meant that a Florida court would not enforce the FS clause if it violated a 
strong public policy of Idaho. The court concluded that this was such a 
case because of the strong public policy embodied in an Idaho statute that 
prohibited foreign FS clauses in contracts like the one involved in this 
case.189 
III. SUMMARY, CRITIQUE, AND CONCLUSIONS 
The primary purpose of this Article is diagnostic—to determine how 
American courts answer the difficult question of what law governs FS 
clauses rather than to posit one answer as the only right one. In keeping 
with this purpose, Part III begins by providing a summary of judicial 
practice. It then continues with the Article’s secondary purpose, which is 
to explain and, in some respects, defend this practice. To this end, subpart 
B reiterates the need for a distinction between interpretation and 
enforceability, subpart C supports the need for a choice-of-law analysis 
for questions of enforceability, and subpart D defends the courts’ practice 
in applying the internal law of the forum to questions of enforceability of 
FS clauses. 
                                                                                                             
 183. Lanier v. Syncreon Holdings, Ltd., No. 11-14780, 2012 WL 3475680 
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 14, 2012). 
 184. Id. 
 185. See, e.g., Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1993); Gen. Eng’g 
Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 186. Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Energywave Corp., 773 P.2d 1143 (Idaho 1989). 
 187. Id. at 1144–45. 
 188. Id. at 1146 (emphasis partially omitted). 
 189. Id. at 1147. 
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A. Summary of Judicial Practice 
As the preceding discussion documents, American courts have 
provided different answers to the question of what law governs a FS 
clause, depending on (1) whether the case is litigated in the court chosen 
or a court not chosen in the clause and (2) whether the case involves the 
interpretation or the enforceability of the clause. These answers are 
summarized below and depicted in Figure 2. 
In Scenario 1, which consists of cases in which the action is filed in 
the court chosen in the FS clause, the courts apply the internal law of the 
forum state without any choice-of-law analysis. They apply that law both 
in interpreting the clause and in deciding whether it is enforceable. In 
Scenario 2, which consists of cases in which the action is filed in a court 
other than the one designated in the FS clause and the contract does not 
contain a choice-of-law clause, the courts apply the internal law of the 
forum state in determining whether the clause is enforceable. A few cases 
undertake a choice-of-law analysis but only in interpreting the clause. 
Finally, in Scenario 3, which consists of cases in which the action is filed 
in a court other than the one designated in the FS clause and the contract 
does contain a choice-of-law clause, the courts, by and large, apply (1) the 
internal law of the forum state in determining whether the FS clause is 
enforceable; and (2) the law chosen in the choice-of-law clause in 
interpreting the FS clause.  
 
FIGURE 2. LAW GOVERNING ENFORCEABILITY AND INTERPRETATION 
OF FS CLAUSES 
 
Scenario 1. 
Action in 
chosen 
court 
Scenario 2. 
Action in 
seized court / 
No choice-of-
law clause 
Scenario 3. 
Action in 
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of-law clause 
Enforce-
ability 
Lex fori Lex fori 
Lex fori Lex contractus Chosen law 
Lex fori 
Interpr-
etation 
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B. Separating Enforceability from Interpretation 
As some courts have noted, the question of the enforceability of FS 
clauses is entirely different from the question of their interpretation, and 
distinguishing between the two “accords with the traditional divide between 
procedural and substantive rules.”190 In other words, “Questions of venue 
and the enforcement of forum selection clauses are essentially procedural, 
rather than substantive, in nature.”191 Although some people might question 
this characterization, not many people would question that the interpretation 
of FS clauses—like the interpretation of a contract—is a “quintessentially 
substantive”192 question. Consequently, like any other substantive question, 
it should not be answered by the law of the forum qua forum. Instead, this 
question should be subject to the choice-of-law inquiry, which may or may 
not lead to the law of the forum.  
The necessity for such an inquiry is more evident in Scenario 3 cases, 
namely cases in which the action is filed in a state other than the one whose 
courts are chosen in the FS clause and in which an outbound choice-of-law 
clause accompanies the FS clause. As long as the case is multistate, 
however, a choice-of-law inquiry is necessary and appropriate even in 
Scenario 2 cases, in which the FS selection clause is not accompanied by a 
choice-of-law clause. Finally, even in Scenario 1 cases in which the action 
is filed in the state whose courts are chosen in the FS clause, a choice-of-
law inquiry is appropriate even if it is unlikely to lead to the law of another 
state. 
C. Law Governing Enforceability 
Once interpretation is separated from enforceability, one can address 
with a clearer mind the question of what law should govern the 
enforceability of FS clauses. In all three scenarios, the vast majority of 
United States courts apply the internal law of the forum state in determining 
whether a FS clause is enforceable and, more often than not, do so without 
a choice-of-law inquiry. Is this a defensible practice?  
In a comprehensive and thoughtful article, Professor Jason Yackee 
sharply criticized this “lex fori bias.”193 He found “little inherent 
                                                                                                             
 190. Martinez v. Bloomberg L.P., 740 F.3d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 191. Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 192. Martinez, 740 F.3d at 221. 
 193. Yackee, supra note 1, at 44, 47, 74, 79, 85, 88.  
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justification for automatically applying lex fori to questions of [] 
enforceability and validity”194 of FS clauses because such a practice  
risks subjecting the contract to multiple laws, . . . makes it difficult 
for parties to anticipate at the contract drafting stage which law will 
actually be applied to [the clause], . . . may promote forum 
shopping, and . . . ignores the parties’ bargained-for jurisdictional 
expectations by overlooking a contract’s explicit or implicit choice 
of law.195 
Yackee argued that  
[FS clauses] should be governed first and foremost by the parties’ 
explicit choice of law. When the parties have apparently 
concluded a choice of law clause that covers the contract in which 
the [clause] is located or referenced, that apparent choice should 
govern [the clause’s] validity and enforceability. In the event that 
the parties have not made an explicit choice, the law of the 
designated forum should govern the [clause]. That law has the 
highest probability of corresponding to the parties’ bargained-for 
jurisdictional expectations in the absence of an explicit choice of 
law.196 
In an equally comprehensive and thoughtful article, Professor Kevin 
Clermont defended the current American practice of applying the lex fori 
in determining the enforceability of FS clauses while agreeing with the 
application of the chosen law in interpreting them. He offered several 
arguments in support of the lex fori, including the following: 
Applying lex fori to the forum-selection clause allows the court to 
control its own jurisdiction and venue, and to do so by uniform 
rules. 
Lex fori would avoid the discomfort of sometimes allowing 
foreign law to determine whether jurisdiction or venue exists in 
the seised court. 
In some thin sense, jurisdiction and venue come first, and so the 
court should decide those questions before performing a choice-
of-law analysis. 
Lex fori would avoid the slight, and not insuperable, illogic of 
assuming an enforceable forum-selection or choice-of-law clause 
                                                                                                             
 194. Id. at 83. 
 195. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 196. Id. at 94. 
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in order to choose the law to determine enforceability. 
For good reasons, courts do not normally interpret choice-of-law 
clauses to cover procedural matters; the enforceability of the 
separable forum-selection clause, sensibly and practically 
considered, appears procedural for this purpose. 
Applying lex fori, rather than the chosen law, to the forum-
selection clause closes the door to abusive clauses: the parties 
could be bootstrapping the forum-selection clause into 
enforceability by choosing a very permissive law, and the stronger 
party could be forcing the weaker party into an unfair forum 
applying unfair law.197 
D. Defending the Choice of the Lex Fori in Some Cases 
All things considered, Clermont has the better arguments. His last 
argument is particularly persuasive, especially because, unlike other 
countries that do not enforce pre-dispute choice-of-forum clauses that are 
unfavorable to consumers or employees,198 American law does not accord 
any a priori protective treatment to these or any other presumptively weak 
parties. As Professor Linda Mullenix noted, 
The [Supreme] Court consistently has turned a blind eye and deaf 
ear on the problem of consumer forum-selection and arbitration 
clauses, instead merging consideration of consumer agreements 
with jurisprudence developed in the dissimilar context of 
sophisticated business partners freely negotiating at arm’s 
length.199 
Mullenix points out that this regime “works to the advantage of prospective 
corporate defendants who . . . exploit forum-selection and choice-of-law 
clauses to their advantage”200 and at the expense of uninformed and 
unsophisticated consumers, employees, franchisees, or other presumptively 
                                                                                                             
 197. Clermont, supra note 33, at 65455 (footnotes omitted). 
 198. See SYMEONIDES, supra note 4, at 441 (discussing the relevant provisions 
of the Brussels I Regulation). Likewise, the Hague Choice of Court Convention 
does not apply to consumer and employment contracts. See Hague Convention, 
supra note 2, art. 2(1). 
 199. Linda S. Mullenix, Gaming the System: Protecting Consumers from 
Unconscionable Contractual Forum-Selection and Arbitration Clauses, 66 
HASTINGS L.J. 719, 719 (2015). 
 200. Id. at 743. 
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weak parties.201 The result is that FS clauses often “provide defendants 
with a ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ forum preference.”202  
In other words, the current regime in the United States is bad enough as 
it is—and will remain so, as long as American courts are unwilling to follow 
the example of other systems, which accord protective treatment to weak 
parties.203 It would be even worse, however, if, in contracts involving these 
parties, the courts were required to apply the law designated in the choice-
of-law clause, a clause usually drafted by the corporate defendant, virtually 
never negotiated, and often unsuspectingly imposed on the weak party.  
Petersen v. Boeing Co.,204 an employment contract case, illustrates the 
potential consequences. The plaintiff, an American citizen, was hired in the 
United States for work in Saudi Arabia through a preliminary agreement that 
did not contain a FS clause.205 Upon arrival in Saudi Arabia, however, “he 
was forced to sign a second employment agreement—which he was not 
given time to read and which he was told he must sign or else return 
                                                                                                             
 201. Professor Mullenix continues,  
The entire doctrine surrounding the sanctity of forum-selection and 
arbitration clauses in the consumer arena essentially has been 
constructed based on a series of somewhat fantastical premises about 
these agreements. It first assumes that the contracting parties consist of 
a (sophisticated) consumer and a corporate or business entity. The 
doctrine assumes a knowledgeable consumer who understands that at 
some future point, the consumer may be involved in a dispute with the 
business entity. The doctrine assumes that this consumer understands 
what a forum choice means . . . . It assumes that this consumer 
understands the consequences of a forum or choice-of-law designation. 
The doctrine assumes that the consumer has read the agreement and 
noticed and read the forum-selection, choice-of-law, or arbitration 
clause. The doctrine assumes that the consumer willingly agrees, in 
advance of any dispute, to waive its choice of forum . . . . The doctrine 
assumes that the consumer (or employee, or small consumer/investor) is 
receiving some unspecified economic benefit from agreeing to the 
forum-selection, choice-of-law, or arbitration provision. The doctrine 
assumes, as Justice Alito put it in Atlantic Marine, that the consumer 
knowingly and willingly waives its “venue privilege.” 
But what if none of this . . . is true? 
Id. at 755–56. 
 202. Id. at 736 (“[F]orum-selection clauses will almost always provide 
defendants with a ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ forum preference.”). 
 203. See supra note 2, referring to the Brussels I Regulation and the Hague 
Choice of Court Convention. 
 204. Petersen v. Boeing Co., 715 F.3d 276 (9th Cir. 2013).  
 205. Id. at 278–79. 
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immediately to the United States at his own expense.”206 This agreement 
contained a FS clause requiring any contractual disputes to be resolved in 
the Labor Courts of Saudi Arabia.207 The plaintiff returned to the United 
States and, appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, sued the defendant, 
alleging facts that not only showed the difficulties of litigating in Saudi 
Arabia but also raised legitimate doubts about whether a valid forum 
selection clause existed in the first place.208 Despite these circumstances, 
the district court dismissed the action without a hearing for improper venue 
under Rule 12(b)(3).209 Fortunately for the plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed and remanded the case with instructions to the trial court to 
conduct such a hearing and to determine (1) whether the clause was the 
result of fraud or overreaching; and (2) whether its enforcement under 
these circumstances would effectively deny the plaintiff his day in court.210 
On remand, the district court held the clause unenforceable, finding 
that because of their discriminatory practices, the Labor Courts of Saudi 
Arabia were not an adequate forum for plaintiff’s claims.211 
                                                                                                             
 206. Id. at 278; see also id. at 279 (“[The plaintiff’s] passport was then 
confiscated; he was effectively imprisoned in his housing compound under 
miserable living conditions; and his work environment was marked by rampant 
safety and ethics violations. When he attempted to resign and return to the United 
States, his employer refused to return his passport for a period of nearly three 
months.”).  
 207. Id. at 278–79. 
 208. The plaintiff attached to his complaint a United States State Department 
Report showing that (1) Saudi authorities would not grant him a visa to re-enter 
Saudi Arabia; (2) if he did re-enter Saudi Arabia, his employer could detain him for 
the entire duration of any legal proceedings because employers “may ask authorities 
to prohibit the employees from departing the country until the dispute is resolved, 
often with the intent to force the employee to accept a disadvantageous settlement 
or risk deportation without any settlement”; and (3) he could not have a fair trial in 
Saudi Arabia because the Saudi judiciary “was not independent and . . . was subject 
to influence by powerful individuals.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 209. Id. at 279. 
 210. The court found that the plaintiff’s allegations, corroborated by evidence, 
were sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the FS was 
enforceable and that the district court had abused its discretion in dismissing the 
action without a hearing. Id. 
 211. See Petersen v. Boeing Co., 108 F. Supp. 3d 726, 731 (D. Ariz. 2015) 
(“Both experts testified that the Saudi Labor Courts (and other Saudi courts) 
employ discriminatory evidentiary rules. A Saudi court will only credit testimony 
if corroborated by two male, Muslim witnesses. This discrimination has direct 
bearing on Plaintiff’s case since his claims are largely based on events not 
memorialized in writing or otherwise recorded. . . . Furthermore, it is undisputed 
Plaintiff lacks male Muslin [sic] witnesses to support his claims.”). 
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Interestingly—and appropriately—the court based this holding on 
federal/forum law rather than on Saudi law, even though the employment 
contract also contained a Saudi choice-of-law clause.212 The court did not 
even mention the choice-of-law clause in deciding the enforceability of 
the FS clause, even though in an earlier—and erroneous—ruling it held 
that the choice-of-law clause was perfectly enforceable in governing the 
merits of the plaintiff’s claims.213 
Indeed, “[r]espect for party autonomy”214 simply is not a persuasive 
reason for referring the validity and enforceability of a FS clause to the 
chosen law. Party autonomy in the choice of substantive law has never 
been unrestricted.215 A fortiori, it should not be unrestricted in the choice 
of forum. Forum selection clauses are different from choice-of-law 
clauses, but the differences suggest less, not more, deference to the former 
clauses, precisely because their enforcement prevents the seized court 
from adjudicating the merits. The Supreme Court in The Bremen correctly 
discounted as “a vestigial legal fiction”216 the notion that FS clauses, of 
their own force, “oust” a court of its jurisdiction.217 They do so only 
because the law of the seized court endows them with that effect. It is 
simplistic to pretend that a FS clause has no effect on the jurisdiction of 
the seized court. When the seized court chooses to abide by a clause 
designating another court, the result is that the seized court cannot, or at 
least will not, hear the merits.  
The question then is whether, in exercising this “choice,” the seized 
court should follow its own law and policy or, instead, those of another 
sovereign. One way of answering this question is to say, as some courts 
have,218 that the enforceability of a FS selection is a procedural issue, 
which, like all procedural issues, is governed by the law of the forum 
without resorting to a choice-of-law analysis. This answer, however, is 
rather simplistic. For example, the statutes that prohibit outbound FS 
clauses in certain contracts, such as consumer or employment contracts,219 
                                                                                                             
 212. Id. at 731–33. 
 213. See Petersen v. Boeing Co., 2014 WL 12516257 (D. Ariz. July 1, 2014), 
reconsideration denied, 2014 WL 12527691 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2014). 
 214. Yackee, supra note 1, at 96 (urging “respect for party autonomy, both to 
choose an exclusive forum in which future disputes may be heard, and to choose, 
explicitly or implicitly, the law that will govern that jurisdictional choice”). 
 215. See SYMEONIDES, supra note 4, at 36879. 
 216. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972). 
 217. Id. 
 218. See, e.g., id. at 10, 12, 15. 
 219. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921.A(2) (2018) (“The provisions of 
every employment contract . . . by which any . . . employer . . . includes a choice 
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clearly are substantive. Nevertheless, by mandating their application to 
cases falling within their scope, these statutes express the state’s strong 
public policy in providing an in-state forum to the affected consumers or 
employees. Neither a choice-of-law clause, which many of these statutes 
expressly prohibit, nor the welcoming statutes of another state should 
negate that policy. As the Second Circuit noted from the perspective of a 
federal court, “If the enforceability of a forum selection clause were 
governed by the law specified in the choice-of-law clause, then contracting 
parties would have an absolute right to ‘oust the jurisdiction’ of the federal 
courts.”220 The court reasoned that to abide by the standards set by the 
Supreme Court in The Bremen, federal law—and by analogy in state cases 
forum law— 
must govern the ultimate enforceability of a forum selection 
clause to ensure that a federal court may decline to enforce a 
clause if “trial in the contractual forum [would] be so gravely 
difficult and inconvenient that [the resisting party] will for all 
practical purposes be deprived of his day in court,” or “if 
enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum 
in which suit is brought . . . .”221  
One such strong public policy is—or should be—the protection of 
presumptively weak parties. If left unchecked, a clever combination of FS 
clauses and choice-of-law clauses easily can evade that policy. Suppose, 
for example, that State X has a pro-business law and an unduly liberal law 
                                                                                                             
of forum clause or choice of law clause . . . shall be null and void except where 
the choice of forum clause or choice of law clause is expressly, knowingly, and 
voluntarily agreed to and ratified by the employee after the occurrence of the 
incident which is the subject of the civil or administrative action.”); see also N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 22B-3 (2018) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, any 
provision in a contract entered into in North Carolina that requires the prosecution 
of any action or the arbitration of any dispute that arises from the contract to be 
instituted or heard in another state is against public policy and is void and 
unenforceable. This prohibition shall not apply to non-consumer loan transactions 
or to any action or arbitration of a dispute that is commenced in another state 
pursuant to a forum selection provision with the consent of all parties to the 
contract at the time that the dispute arises.”). 
 220. Martinez v. Bloomberg L.P., 740 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 221. Id. (quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15, 18); see also id. at 220 (“To 
ensure that federal courts account for both the important interests served by forum 
selection clauses and the strong public policies that might require federal courts 
to override such clauses, therefore, federal law must govern their 
enforceability.”). 
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in favoring FS clauses. For those reasons, the strong contracting party—
for example, a corporate defendant—imposes on the weak party—for 
example, a consumer—the “choice” of State X’s courts and law, even 
though State X has only a nominal connection with the case. Do other 
states owe a blank check to the strong party? 
As documented elsewhere, such a combination of choice-of-law and 
FS clauses can be deadly for consumers or employees.222 Franchisees are 
equally vulnerable to the superior bargaining power of franchisors, which 
is why many states have enacted statutes regulating franchise contracts in 
detail and prohibiting the waiver of franchisee protection.223 Many of those 
statutes specifically prohibit outbound choice-of-law clauses, and a few of 
them prohibit outbound FS causes.224 The protection that these prohibitions 
seek to provide would become meaningless if those states were required to 
apply the contractually chosen law to determine the enforceability of an 
outbound FS clause that the statute directly or indirectly prohibits. 
Kubis & Perszyk Associates, Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc. is an 
example of this scenario, although the chosen forum was in the 
franchisor’s home state and thus did not lack a connection with the case.225 
A contract between a California franchisor and a New Jersey franchisee 
contained a California choice-of-law clause and an exclusive California 
FS clause.226 The New Jersey Franchise Act did not expressly prohibit 
these clauses, but it did prohibit waivers of other franchisee-protecting 
provisions.227 When the franchisor terminated the franchise, the franchisee 
sued the franchisor in New Jersey.228 The trial court dismissed the action 
based on the California FS clause.229 The intermediate court affirmed, 
reasoning that it “should trust the courts of California to be as protective 
of the rights of the New Jersey litigant under New Jersey law as it would 
hope another state would protect a California resident under California 
                                                                                                             
 222. See SYMEONIDES, supra note 4, at 40926.  
 223. See id. at 426–32. 
 224. See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 15-7-120(A) (2018) (“Notwithstanding a provision 
in a contract requiring a cause of action arising under it to be brought in a location 
other than as provided in this title and the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 
for a similar cause of action, the cause of action alternatively may be brought in 
the manner provided in this title and the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 
for such causes of action.”). 
 225. Kubis & Perszyk Assocs., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 680 A.2d 618 
(N.J. 1996). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 622. 
 228. Id. at 618. 
 229. Id. 
1160 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
 
 
law, if the case were referred elsewhere.”230 The court expressed 
confidence that the California court “will fairly and impartially adjudicate 
the dispute between the parties in accordance with the governing law, 
which in this case might happen to be the law of New Jersey,”231 despite 
the California choice-of-law clause. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed.232 After an extensive 
discussion of the legislative history and text of the New Jersey Franchise 
Act and the policies it embodied, the court concluded that enforcement of 
the FS clause “would substantially undermine the protections that the 
Legislature intended to afford to all New Jersey franchisees.”233 The court 
reasoned that a FS clause can “materially diminish the rights guaranteed by 
the Franchise Act” by “mak[ing] litigation more costly and cumbersome for 
economically weaker franchisees that often lack the sophistication and 
resources to litigate effectively a long distance from home.”234 The court 
expressed its concern—not only about the strong likelihood that the 
California court would not apply the New Jersey Franchise Act but also 
about “the denial of a franchisee’s right to obtain injunctive and other relief 
from a New Jersey court.”235 For, “even if a California and a New Jersey 
court afforded identical relief under the Act to an aggrieved franchisee, there 
may be a difference of substantial magnitude in the practical accessibility of 
that relief from the perspective of an unsophisticated and underfinanced 
New Jersey franchisee.”236 
CONCLUSION 
The primary purpose of this Article was to describe what courts do on 
this previously unexplored subject, rather than what they should do. As the 
discussion in Part III indicates, however, this does not mean that the author 
has no opinions on the matter. Rather it means that those opinions are just 
that. For what it may be worth, the author agrees with the holding and 
reasoning of the Petersen and Kubis & Perszyk courts and any other court 
“seized” under similar circumstances that takes the same position. FS 
clauses and choice-of-law clauses contribute to the smooth flow of 
interstate and international commerce by providing contracting parties 
                                                                                                             
 230. Id. at 620 (quoting the intermediate court). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 618. 
 233. Id. at 626. 
 234. Id. at 627. 
 235. Id. at 628. 
 236. Id. 
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with much needed certainty regarding the place of litigation and its likely 
outcome. In cases involving parties with disproportionally unequal 
bargaining power, however, a clever combination of FS and choice-of-law 
clauses can deprive presumptively weak parties like consumers and 
employees of any meaningful opportunity to assert their legitimate rights. 
Other legal systems avoid this problem through the enactment of 
legislation specifically addressing these cases. In the United States, some 
states have also enacted similar statutes, but most states have not. In the 
absence of such protective statutes, the task of protecting the 
presumptively weak parties falls on the courts. One hopes that, in deciding 
cases involving such parties, courts will be as vigilant as the Petersen and 
Kubis & Perszyk courts in scrutinizing the potentially abusive combination 
of FS clauses and choice-of-law clauses. 
